SMU Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 4

Article 12

January 1966

Negotiability of a Note Attached to a Contract in Texas
Pauline R. Karlsberg

Recommended Citation
Pauline R. Karlsberg, Note, Negotiability of a Note Attached to a Contract in Texas, 20 SW L.J. 895 (1966)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol20/iss4/12

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information,
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

1966]

NOTES

more complete curtailment, even a total one, should be necessary to
prevent impairment of that policy, the Court will be free to reconsider today's holding."" In effect, the Court has established a, policy
of deciding in each kind of case how the tort remedy will affect the
collective bargaining process. Instead of interpreting the intent of
Congress through "elucidating litigation," the Court is exercising a
type of conscious judicial legislation specifically prohibited in Garmon." "The Court's decision," as the dissent concluded, "both underestimates the damage libel suits may inflict on the equilibrium, and
overestimates the effectiveness of the restraint which will result
from
3
superimposed requirements of malice and special damages."
Jerry Lee Arnold

Negotiability of a Note Attached to a Contract in Texas
If a note, otherwise negotiable, is attached by perforation to a
contract and both are transferred,' there may be a question as to
whether or not the note remains negotiable. It is arguable that the
attachment of a note and contract renders the note contingent or
makes it impossible for one to be a holder in due course of the note.
Texas courts have not squarely resolved this problem, nor does the
Uniform Commercial Code specifically deal with it.' Those jurisdictions which have considered the issue have determined that the transfer of a note and contract which are attached by a perforation does
not affect the negotiability of the note.'
"Id. at 67.
aaIn San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959),

the Court

stated:

13

The nature of the judicial process precludes an ad hoc inquiry into the
special problems of labor-management relations involved in a particular set of
occurrences in order to ascertain the precise nature and degree of federal-state
conflict there involved, and more particularly what exact mischief such a conflict would cause. Nor is it our business to attempt this. Such determinations
inevitably depend upon judgments on the impact of these particular conflicts
on the entire scheme of federal labor policy and administration. Our task is
confined to dealing with classes of situations. To the National Labor Relations
Board and to Congress must be left those precise and closely limited demarcations that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and administration.
383 U.S. at 73.

1 Since the terms transfer, negotiate,

and assign have specific meanings in the area of

negotiable instruments, the word transfer is being used to designate a delivery of and change
in ownership of an instrument by one party to another, without assuming either a valid
negotiation or an assignment has been made.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-105, 3-112, 3-119.
'Certified Motors v. Nolan Loan Co., 122 A.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 214 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1950), affirming en banc,
208 P.2d 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Allison Ford Sales v. Farmers State Bank, 86 N.W.2d
896 (Iowa 1957); Northwestern Fin. Co. v. Crouch, 242 N.W. 771 (Mich. 1932); Shattuck
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Only one Texas case has been found which bears directly on the
question of the note's negotiability.' There a contract, attached to an
otherwise negotiable note from which it was separated by only a perforated line, provided specifically for its detachment from the note.
The court, turning to this specific provision, held that "it was the
intention of the parties that the latter [viz., the note] should constitute a negotiable instrument, and that the Burton-Parker Manufacturing Company was authorized to detach and use it as such."' The
court did not consider the issues which would have been involved if
the contract had not so clearly permitted detachment or if the contract
with or without such provisions had still been attached to the note
when negotiation of the note to a third person was attempted. Dictum
by another civil appeals court indicated that a note's being "followed
by a chattel mortgage form did not convert it into a contingent
obligation."' The statement was irrelevant, however, since the plaintiff's cause of action did not depend on negotiability. In one case'
a note attached to a contract was found to be non-negotiable, but this
was because the note itself contained several conditions and was contingent upon the fulfillment of the contract.
Due to the paucity of cases which deal with this problem, its resolution must be derived from an examination of analagous situations.
Some analogies may be made with transactions, substantively similar to the one under discussion, although the note is physically distinct from any collateral agreement that may or may not be involved. Other comparisons may be drawn with cases that consider
the various problems which arise after a note actually attached to a
contract has been detached.
Contemporaneous Agreements Agreements executed contemporaneously with a negotiable instrument as part of the same transaction are generally construed together as one contract between the
original parties unless this is contrary to the express intent of the
parties' or unless the contract is repugnant to express provisions of
v. Reed, 190 N.W. 649 (Mich. 1922); First & Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, 18
N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1945); First Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 229 N.W. 334 (Neb. 1930);
Shawano Fin. Corp. v. Julius, 254 N.W. 355 (Wis. 1934); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8, 63
(1955); 10 C.J.S. Bills 1 Notes § 44(b) (1938); 11 AM. JuR. 2d Bills &1Notes§ 70 (1963).
'Cedar
Rapids Nat'l Bank v. Barnes, 142 S.W. 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
5
d. at 633.
'Strom
v. Dickson, 360 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
7
Southwest Contract Purchase Corp. v. McGee, 296 S.W. 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
'Head

v. Wollmann, 272 F.2d 298

(5th Cir. 1960); Motor & Industrial Fin. Corp. v.

Hughes, 294 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); First Prize, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. of Cal., 269 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Allied Bldg. Credits Inc. v. Ellis, 258
S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 195
S.W.2d 412

(Tex. Civ. App.

Shaw, 45 S.W.2d 193

1946), rev'd, 120 Tex. 240,

36 S.W.2d 978; McFarland v.

(Tex. Comm. App. 1932); Stubblefield v. Copper, 37 S.W.2d 818
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the note.' Such construction affects neither the negotiability of the
contemporaneous note' nor the status of a third party as a holder
in due course." Due to the construction given to the contemporaneously executed note and contract, they are as much one unit as are
the note and contract attached by perforation. Cases in other jurisdictions have, in fact, treated the attached note and contract as simultaneously executed instruments."
References to Other Instruments Along similar lines references
to extrinsic, executory contracts within a negotiable note do not destroy negotiability when the note is not conditioned upon the contract." The Texas Supreme Court has held: "[T]he rule in this state
undoubtedly is that before a reference in an otherwise negotiable
instrument to another agreement will make the former non-negotiable, 'it must appear therefrom that the paper is to be burdened
with the conditions of this agreement.' "" A fortiori, the mere securing of a negotiable note by a collateral, executory agreement does not
alter the note's negotiability.'5 If reference in a note to an outside
agreement does not impair the note's negotiability, the attachment
of an outside agreement should have no different effect. The mere
attachment neither imposes any further conditions on the terms of
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Camp v. Dallas Nat'l. Bank, 21 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929), modified, 36 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); 9 TEX. JUR. 2d Bills F
Notes § 51 (1959); 11 Am. JuR. 2d Bills & Notes § 70 (1963); 10 C.J.S. Bills & Notes
§ 44b (1938).
9 Peavey-Moore Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 Tex. 467, 128 S.W.2d 1158 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1939); 9 TEx. JuR. 2d Bills & Notes § 51 (1959); 11 AM. JuR. 2d Bills (9
Notes § 71 (1963); 10 C.J.S. Bills & Notes 5§44b, 45 (1938).
'0Motor & Industrial Fin. Corp. v. Hughes, 294 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956);
First Prize Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 269 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Allied
Bldg. Credit Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Stubblefield v. Copper,
37 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; 9 TEx. JUR. 2d Bills d Notes. § 51
(1959); 11 Am. JuR. 2d Bills & Notes § 72 (1963); 10 C.J.S. Bills & Notes §§ 44b, 45
(1938).
"Continental Nat'1 Bank v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948); Fortner
v. Johnson, 404 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Corey,
29 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
"Certified Motors v. Nolan Loan Co., 122 A.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 214 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1950) affirming en banc,
208 P.2d 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); First & Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, 18
N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1945); First Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 229 N.W. 334 (Neb. 1930).
"Zarsky Lumber Co. v. Guiberteau, 270 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Arrington
v. Mercantile Protective Bureau, 24 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930); C. H. Mountjoy
Parts Co. v. San Antonio Nat'l Bank, 12 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); American
Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Steeley, 10 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Lane Co. V. Crum,
291 S.W. 1084 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927); Cramer v. Dallas Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 596
(Tex.
4 Civ. App. 1926); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

1 Continental Bank v. Conner,
"Continental Bank v. Conner,
Inc. v. Lippman, 254 S.W.2d 184
267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), rev'd
v. Womack, 65 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.

55

3-112, 3-119.

147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. 1948).
147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948); Steves & Sons,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Harrison v. Ingham, 223 S.W.2d
on other grounds, 224 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. 1949); White
Civ. App. 1933).
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the note nor gives any greater notice to a taker of the note than
would a reference contained in the note itself.
Notations Notations written on and contemporaneously with a
negotiable instrument may become part of the instrument if the parties thereto have so understood, intended, or agreed, but this does not
affect negotiability. 6 In addition, the notation will not control if
there is a discrepancy between it and a positive provision of the instrument." Similarly, if a note is attached to a contract, the note itself
should control over the contract provisions, the note being an entire
instrument in itself.
Detachment Cases dealing with detached notes (notes, formerly
attached to collateral agreements, then separately transferred) provide further support for the contention that the note should be negotiable while it is still attached to the agreement. Generally the separation of a note from a collateral agreement does not serve to put
the taker of such note on notice and deprive him of his standing as

a holder in due course. 8 In Security Fin. Co. v. Floyd'9 where the
appellant had purchased notes already detached from a contract of
sale by the payee (the contract authorizing such detachment) the
court stated:
The fact that the note had some 'perforated or rough edges' does not
affect the status of appellant as an innocent purchaser. At most, it could
but raise the surmise that it had been detached from something else. If
appellant, so surmising, had inspected the contract from which they

1 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Service Trust Co., 385 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(dealing with a trust receipt); Weaver v. Weaver, 171 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Peavey-Moore Lumber Co. Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 Tex. 467, 128 S.W.2d 1158 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1939); Bryson v. Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co., 61 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933); Meads v. Sandidge, 30 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895); 9 TEx. JUR. 2d Bills
& Notes § 49 (1959); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 251 (1928); Annot., 155 A.L.R. 218 (1945).
On the other hand, if the parties' intention is to the opposite effect, the notation may constitute material alteration. See Clifton Mercantile Co. v. Gillaspie, 7 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928); Landon v. Halcomb, 184 S.W. 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Meade v. Sandidge,
9 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 30 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895); Bowser v. Cole, 11 S.W. 1131
(Tex. 1889). For cases holding that a notation is not a material alteration due to the specific
facts of such cases, see, e.g., Foster v. Iowa City State Bank, 201 S.W. 733 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918); Yost v. Watertown Steam Engine Co., 24 S.W. 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
17 Huth
v. Huth, 110 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Reed v. Watson, 262 S.W.
178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Clem v. Chapman, 262 S.W. 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924);
Washington County State Bank v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 168 S.W. 456 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914); Dark v. Middlebrook, 45 S.W. 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898). See also Marrow
v. Richardson, 6 S.W. 763, 764 (Tex. 1887) holding that an erasure of the marginal words
on a note "renewed" or "renewed by another note" was immaterial since the note was otherwise negotiable and the body of the note itself contained no erasures to make it irregular:
an erasure of a notation found to comprise part of a negotiable instrument was held to be
a material alteration in Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. Vanderpool, 192 S.W. 589 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1917).
"SSecurity Fin. Co. v. Schoenig, 292 S.W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also notes 29
and 30 infra; 3 TEX. JuR. 2d Alteration of Instruments § 30 (1959).
"9Security Fin. Co. v. Floyd, 294 S.W. 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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were in fact detached, it would have found printed thereon the authority of the payee to detach the note. Inspecting the contract, it would
have found nothing to arouse any suspicion respecting the validity of
the obligations evidenced by the note."0
Meade v. Sandige5 goes further by stating that the liability of the

maker of a negotiable instrument to the endorsee is "placed upon the
ground that the maker of a negotiable paper is liable to the bona fide
holder on account of his own negligence in executing and issuing a

note that invited tampering with.""
The detachment of a note from an agreement, however, may constitute material alteration as between the original parties when the

parties thereto have specifically intended that there be no such separation." If the detachment is authorized by the contract, it will not

result in material alteration of the note." One civil appeals case " holds
that separating a note from a collateral agreement, along a perforated
line voids the note on the ground that the note is "an entire con-

tract"2 itself. Thus, since "the contract which defendant executed
was in no sense a negotiable instrument . . . it is immaterial that the
alteration gave to an otherwise non-negotiable instrument [the note]
the form and semblance of negotiability."2 These conclusions are not

supported by the cited cases. Most of the cases cited by the court
stand for the proposition that detachment of a note from a contract
constitutes material alteration only when the parties do not intend

that such detachment occur. " One of the cited cases held that erasure
of a notation on a note, the notation being part of such note, constituted material alteration. "
20

Id. at 1114. See also Iowa City State Bank v. Milford, 200 S.W. 883 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917); Landon v. Huston Drug Co., 190 S.W. 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
2 Meade v. Sandidge, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 30 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
22 Id.
at 247.
23 Stevens v. Wheeler, 3 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Landon v. Halcomb, 184
S.W. 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); 3 TEx. JuR. 2d Alteration of Instruments § 30 (1959).
See also Spencer v. Tripplett, 184 S.W. 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) where there was no perforation separating the attached note and contract and the court held that subsequent detachment voided the note on the grounds of material alteration.
24Stevens v. Floresville Quick Serv. Station, 25 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930);
Commercial Credit Co. v. Giles, 207 S.W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Iowa City State
Bank v. Milford, 200 S.W. 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Harrison v. Hunter, 168 S.W.
1036 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
2 Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 6 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
"Id. at 800.
27

Ibid.

28State

Bank v. Williams, 277 S.W. 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Commercial Security

Co. v. Hull, 212 S.W. 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Spencer v. Tripplett, 184 SW. 712
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Landon v. Halcomb, 184 S.W. 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
219Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. Vanderpool, 192 S.W. 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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CONCLUSION

The mere fact that the question of negotiability of a note attached
to a collateral agreement has so infrequently been raised or discussed

by Texas courte' appears to indicate that the negotiability of the
note is an accepted fact."
Other jurisdictions have reached the result argued for here, i.e.,
negotiability, principally by considering the transfer of an attached
note and contract to be like a transaction involving simultaneously
executed instruments. " The rationale behind such conclusions would
seem to be a recognition of the need to permit broad use of negotiable

instruments. " A California court of civil appeals in upholding the
negotiability of a note attached to a conditional sales contract stated:
"If defendant's contention were to be enforced financing of this type
of business transaction would
become too hazardous for the risking of
''
capital employed in it.

This attitude is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code since
the "underlying purposes and policies of this Act are . . . to simplify,

clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions. '
To disallow the negotiability of a note attached by perforation to a
contract would be antithetical to this statement of policy.
Pauline R. Karlsberg

°See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
"'E.g., in Adams v. Eastex Fin. Co., 379 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), holding
that the appellee as owner of the chattel mortgages (due to an assignment) had authority to
repossess and sell the cars. The chattel mortgages had been attached to notes and executed
by appellant's customers, as security for payment, authorizing repossession and sale. The
appellant had assigned all mortgages to appellee for the note. The court made no mention
of the notes or of the fact that they were attached to the chattel mortgages, apparently
assuming that the notes were negotiable.
Z See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
" Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 208 P.2d 780 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1949); Allison Ford Sales v. Farmers State Bank, 86 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1957).
'Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 208 P.2d 780, 783 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1949).
35
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102 (2) (a).

